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This paper argues that a large component of success in entrepreneurship and venture capital can be
attributed to skill. We show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are more likely to
succeed than first time entrepreneurs and those who have previously failed. Funding by more
experienced venture capital firms enhances the chance of success, but only for entrepreneurs without
a successful track record. Similarly, more experienced venture capitalists are able to identify and
invest in first time entrepreneurs who are more likely to become serial entrepreneurs. Investments
by venture capitalists in successful serial entrepreneurs generate higher returns for their venture
capital investors. This finding provides further support for the role of skill in both entrepreneurship
and venture capital.
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What makes entrepreneurs successful?  Is it skill or luck?   Knight (1921, part III, 
ch. IX, ¶ 10) argues that an important component of entrepreneurship is the willingness 
of the “venturesome to ‘assume’ or ‘insure’ the doubtful and timid by guaranteeing to the 
latter a specified income in return for an assignment of the actual results.” In this view, 
luck is a big determinant of entrepreneurial success.  According to Kihlstrom and Laffont 
(1979), luck is the only determinant of entrepreneurial success: in their model 
entrepreneurs are simply less risk averse individuals who are willing to guarantee 
workers’ wages and bear residual risk.    Schumpeter (1934, p. 137) argues just the 
opposite, claiming that “the entrepreneur is never the risk bearer,” but rather an 
innovator, one who discovers new production processes, finds new markets, creates new 
types of organizations, or introduces new products. Entrepreneurial success, in this view, 
flows from innovative skill.  Only suppliers of capital bear risk.   
In this paper, we empirically reject the Kihlstrom and Laffont hypothesis that 
entrepreneurs are just efficient risk bearers in favor of the view, emphasized by 
Schumpeter, that skill is an important component of entrepreneurship. At the same time, 
we present evidence that suppliers of capital are not just efficient risk bearers in the 
entrepreneurial process, as Schumpeter suggests, but rather bring their own set of 
capabilities to identifying skilled entrepreneurs and helping them build their businesses.  
Our approach to identifying skill in entrepreneurship is to examine the 
performance of venture-capital backed serial entrepreneurs.  We try to answer the 
following simple question:  Are successful entrepreneurs more likely to succeed in their 
next ventures than first-time entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who previously failed?  Our   2
answer is yes.   Our empirical model indicates that entrepreneurs who succeeded in a 
prior venture (i.e., started a company that went public) have a 30% chance of succeeding 
in their next venture. By contrast, first-time entrepreneurs have only an 18% chance of 
succeeding and entrepreneurs who previously failed have a 20% chance of succeeding.  
This performance persistence suggests that a component of success in entrepreneurship is 
attributable to skill.  While it may be better to be lucky than smart, the evidence 
presented here indicates that being smart has value too.  
We also find evidence in support of the entrepreneurial skill hypothesis by 
examining the behavior and performance of venture capital firms.  As has been shown by 
Sorensen (2004), Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 
(2006),  and Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2006), companies that are funded by more 
experienced (top-tier) venture capital firms are more likely to succeed.  This could be 
because top-tier venture capital firms are better able to identify high quality companies 
and entrepreneurs.  Alternatively, this performance differential could be because top-tier 
venture capital firms add more value – e.g., by helping new ventures make customer 
contacts, fill key management positions, or set business strategy.  However, we find that 
there is only a performance differential when venture capital firms invest in companies 
started by first-time entrepreneurs or those who previously failed.  If a company is started 
by an entrepreneur with a track record of success, then the company is no more likely to 
succeed if it is funded by a top-tier venture capital firm or one in the lower tier.  Thus, it 
seems, prior success is a public signal of quality.  It also implies that previously 
successful entrepreneurs derive no benefits from the value-added services of more   3
experienced venture capital firms; successful entrepreneurs apparently know what they’re 
doing.    
Another piece of evidence in support of the entrepreneurial skill hypothesis is that 
when previously successful entrepreneurs raise funding for their next venture, they are 
able to do so when the company is younger and at an earlier stage of development.  
Presumably, this is the case because venture capital firms perceive a successful track 
record as evidence of skill, not just luck.  
Taken together, these findings also support the view that suppliers of capital are 
not just efficient risk-bearers, but rather help to put capital in the right hands and ensure 
that it is used effectively.  The evidence for this goes beyond the finding–documented 
here and by others–that more experienced venture capital firms have higher success rates 
on their investments. More experienced venture capital firms only have higher success 
rates when they invest in unproven entrepreneurs, a fact which highlights the role 
suppliers of venture capital play in identifying skilled entrepreneurs and helping them to 
succeed. 
  Finally, we study the value consequences of serial entrepreneurship.  We start by 
examining the pre-money valuations of new ventures.  More experienced venture capital 
firms invest at higher valuations, which is consistent with our finding that they also 
invest in firms with higher success rates.  However, we do not find that serial 
entrepreneurs (whether successful or not) are able to benefit from their higher success 
rates by selling equity at higher prices.  Given this fact, it should come as no surprise that 
the average investment multiple (exit valuation divided by pre-money valuation) is 
higher for companies of previously successful serial entrepreneurs.   We also find that   4
fund returns are higher for venture capital firms that tend to invest a larger share of their 
portfolio in serial entrepreneurs.  Our findings are consistent with there being an 
imperfectly competitive venture capital market in which prices do not get bid up to the 
point where excess returns from investing in serial entrepreneurs are eliminated.        
  Our findings are related to a number of other studies in the entrepreneurship 
literature.  Several study the effect of experience on performance.  Consistent with our 
findings, Eesley and Roberts (2006a) use data from a survey of alumni from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to show that entrepreneurial experience increases 
the likelihood of success (as measured by firm revenues).  Our finding that serial 
entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed is also consistent with the observations of 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2003), who study the contractual terms of venture capital 
financings.  They find that serial entrepreneurs receive more favorable control provisions 
than first time entrepreneurs, including more favorable board control, vesting, liquidation 
rights, and more up-front capital. Presumably this is because their higher success rates 
make it less important for venture capitalists to protect themselves with tighter control 
provisions.   
Chatterji (2005) shows that industry experience also increases the likelihood of 
success.  In the medical device industry, startups founded by former employees of other 
medical device companies perform better than other startups.  The value of industry 
experience is also emphasized by Bhide (2000), who shows that a substantial fraction of 
the Inc. 500 got their ideas for their new company while working for their prior 
employer. Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stromberg (2006) emphasize the importance of 
management in the success of entrepreneurial firms. Carroll and Mosakowski (1987),   5
Honig and Davidson (2000) and Reuber, Dyke and Fischer (1990) are other related 
works.   
Finally, a number of papers have examined the characteristics of serial 
entrepreneurs.  Eesley and Roberts (2006b) find that entrepreneurs are more likely to start 
another venture if they started their first venture when they were younger, were not 
married, and funding their first company with venture capital.  Bengtsson (2005, 2006) 
finds that failed serial entrepreneurs are more likely than successful serial entrepreneurs 
to get funding from the same venture capital firm that financed their first ventures.  
Consistent with our finding on the role of venture capitalists, he argues that these initial 
venture capitalists are better able to judge whether the venture failed because of bad luck 
or the limitations of the entrepreneur. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the construction 
of the data set and summarizes the data.  Our main findings are presented in Section 3.  




The core data for the analysis come from Dow Jones’ Venture Source (previously 
named Venture One), described in more detail in Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein 
(2005).  Venture Source, established in 1987, collects data on firms that have obtained 
venture capital financing.  Firms that have received early-stage financing exclusively from 
individual investors, federally chartered Small Business Investment Companies, and 
corporate development groups are not included in the database. The companies are initially 
identified from a wide variety of sources, including trade publications, company Web pages,   6
and telephone contacts with venture investors.  Venture Source then collects information 
about the businesses through interviews with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. The data 
collected include the identity of the key founders (the crucial information used here) as well 
as the industry, strategy, employment, financial history, and revenues of the company.  Data 
on the firms are updated and validated through monthly contacts with investors and 
companies.   
When considering and controlling for the role of the venture capital investor, we 
consider only observations in which the venture capital firm serves on the board of the 
company.   We do not consider the influence of other venture investors who do not serve 
on the board of directors.  Our analysis focuses on data covering investments from 1975 
to 2000, dropping information prior to 1975 due to data quality concerns.
1  In keeping 
with industry estimates of a maturation period of three to five years for venture capital 
financed companies, we drop companies receiving their first venture capital investment 
after 2000 so that the outcome data can be meaningfully interpreted.   Results were 
qualitatively similar when we ran the analyses looking only at data through 1998 in order to 
be conservative about exit periods. 
For the purposes of this analysis, we examine the founders (henceforth referred to as 
“entrepreneurs”) that joined firms listed in the Venture Source database during the period 
from 1986 to 2000.  Typically, the database reports the previous affiliation and title (at the 
previous employer) of these entrepreneurs, as well as the date they joined the firm.  In some 
cases, however, Venture Source did not collect this information.  In these cases, we attempt 
to find this information by examining contemporaneous news stories in LEXIS-NEXIS, 
                                                 
1Gompers and Lerner (2004) discuss the coverage and selection issues in Venture Economics and Venture 
Source data prior to 1975.    7
securities filings, and web sites of surviving firms.  We believe this data collection 
procedure may introduce a bias in favor of having more information on successful firms, but 
it is not apparent to us that it affects our analysis.  
We identify serial entrepreneurs through their inclusion as founders in more than 
one company in our data set.  As a result, we may fail to identify serial entrepreneurs who 
had previously started companies that were not venture capital financed.  Thus, our study is 
only about serial entrepreneurship in venture capital-financed firms, not about serial 
entrepreneurship in general. To the extent that prior experience in non-venture-backed 
companies is important, we will be understating the effect of entrepreneurial experience.  
Table 1 reports the number and fraction of serial entrepreneurs in our sample in each 
year.  Several patterns are worth highlighting.  First, the number of entrepreneurs in the 
sample increased slowly from 1984 through 1994.  Afterwards, as the Internet and 
technology boom took off in the mid-1990s, the number of entrepreneurs grew very rapidly.  
Second, with the general growth of the industry through this period, serial entrepreneurs 
accounted for an increasing fraction of the sample, growing from about 7% in 1986 to a 
peak of 13-14% in 1994.  There was some decrease in the fraction of serial entrepreneurs 
after 1994, probably because of the influx of first-time entrepreneurs as part of the Internet 
boom. The absolute number of serial entrepreneurs actually peaked in 1999.  
 Table 2 documents the distribution of serial entrepreneurs across industries based 
on the nine industry groupings used in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006).  
The data show a clear concentration of entrepreneurs in the three sectors that are most 
closely associated with the venture capital industry: Internet and computers; 
communications and electronics; and biotech and healthcare.  These are also the three   8
industries with the highest representation of serial entrepreneurs. The other industries, such 
as financial services and consumer, are smaller and have a lower percentage of serial 
entrepreneurs. 
Table 3 lists the 50 most active venture capital firms in our sample and ranks 
them according to both the number of serial entrepreneurs they have funded and the 
fraction of serial entrepreneurs in their portfolios.  Given that many successful venture 
capital firms have an explicit strategy of funding serial entrepreneurs, it is not surprising 
that these firms have higher rates of serial entrepreneurship than the sample average. This 
tabulation suggests that the biggest and most experienced venture capital firms are more 
successful in recruiting serial entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, there does appear to be quite 
a bit of heterogeneity among these firms in their funding of serial entrepreneurs. Some of 
the variation may stem from the industry composition of their portfolios, the length of 
time that the groups have been active investors, and the importance they place on funding 
serial entrepreneurs.  In any case, the reliance on serial entrepreneurs of the largest, most 
experienced, and most successful venture capital firms indicates that we will need to 
control for venture capital firm characteristics in trying to identify an independent effect 
of serial entrepreneurship. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the data we use in our regression analysis. 
We present data for (1) all entrepreneurs in their first ventures; (2) entrepreneurs who have 
started only one venture; (3) serial entrepreneurs in their first venture; and (4) serial 
entrepreneurs in their later ventures.  
The first variable we look at is the success rate within these subgroups of 
entrepreneurs.  We define “success” as going public or filing to go public by December   9
2003.  The findings are similar if we define success to also include firms that were acquired 
or merged.  The overall success rate on first time ventures is 25.3%. Not surprisingly, serial 
entrepreneurs have an above-average success rate of 36.9% on their first ventures: venture 
capitalists are more likely to be more enthusiastic about financing a successful entrepreneur 
than one who has previously failed.  It is more interesting that in their subsequent ventures 
they have a significantly higher success rate (29.0%) than do first time entrepreneurs 
(25.3%).  
Serial entrepreneurs have higher success rates, even though on average they receive 
venture capital funding at an earlier stage in their company's development.  While 45% of 
first-time ventures receive first-round funding at an early stage (meaning they are classified 
as “startup,” “developing product,” or “beta testing,” and not yet “profitable” or “shipping 
product”), close to 60% of entrepreneurs receive first-round funding at an early stage when 
it is their second or later venture.  The later ventures of serial entrepreneurs also receive 
first-round funding when the ventures are younger–21 months as compared to 37 months for 
first time entrepreneurs.  This earlier funding stage is also reflected in lower first-round pre-
money valuations for serial entrepreneurs–$12.3 million as compared to $16.0 million for 
first-time entrepreneurs.  
Controlling for year, serial entrepreneurs appear to be funded by more experienced 
venture capital firms, both in their first and subsequent ventures.
2  The last row of Table 4 
reports the ratio of the number of prior investments made by the venture capital firm to the 
average number of prior investments made by other venture capital firms in the year of the 
investment.  This ratio is consistently greater than one because more experienced (and likely 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, we use venture capital experience as a proxy for ability.  Recently, other measures 
of ability have been utilized including centrality of the venture capitalists in the overall venture capital 
network (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2006; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001).   10
larger) venture capital firms do more deals.  The table indicates that venture capital firms 
that invest in serial entrepreneurs, whether in their first or subsequent ventures, have nearly 
three times the average experience of the average firm investing in the same year.  This is 
about 14% greater than the year-adjusted experience of venture capital firms that invest in 
one-time-only entrepreneurs.
3 Given the evidence that more experienced venture capital 
firms have higher success rates (e.g., Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2006) it 
will be important for us to control for venture capital experience in our regression, as well as 
other factors such as company location, which has also been linked to outcomes.   
 
3.  Findings 
A. Success 
In this section we take a regression approach to exploring the impact of serial 
entrepreneurs on the success of the companies they start.  In the first set of regressions, 
the unit of analysis is the entrepreneur at the time that the database first records the firm’s 
venture capital funding. Our basic approach is to estimate logistic regressions where the 
outcome is whether the firm “succeeds,” i.e. goes public or registers to go public by 
December 2003. Our results are qualitatively similar if we also include an acquisition as 
a successful outcome.   
A main variable of interest in the initial regressions is a dummy variable, LATER 
VENTURE, which takes the value one if the entrepreneur had previously been a founder 
of a venture capital backed company.  We are also interested in whether the entrepreneur 
                                                 
3Note that venture capital firms that invest in the first ventures of serial entrepreneurs have done fewer 
deals on an absolute basis. This is because these first deals are early in the sample period.   11
had succeeded in his prior venture, and thus construct a dummy variable, PRIOR 
SUCCESS, to take account of this possibility. 
There are a number of controls that must be included in the regression as well.  
As noted above, we control for venture capitalists’ experience. The simplest measure of 
experience would be the number of prior companies in which the venture capital firm 
invested. We take a log transformation of this number to reflect the idea that an 
additional investment made by a firm that has done relatively few deals is more 
meaningful than an additional investment by a firm that has done many.  However, 
because of the growth and maturation of the venture capital industry, there would be a 
time trend in this measure of experience.  This is not necessarily a problem: investors in 
the latter part of the sample do have more experience.  Nevertheless, we use a more 
conservative measure of experience, which adjusts for the average level of experience of 
other venture capital firms in the relevant year. Thus, our measure of experience for a 
venture capital investor is the log of one plus the number of prior companies in which the 
venture capital firm has invested minus the log of one plus the average number of prior 
investments undertaken by venture capital firms in the year of the investment. Because 
there are often multiple venture capital firms investing in a firm in the first round, we 
take experience of the most experienced investor who serves on the board of directors of 
the firms after the first venture financing round of the company, which we label VC 
EXPERIENCE.
4 
                                                 
4We have replicated the analysis using the average experience of investors from the earliest round and 
employing an entrepreneur-company-VC firm level analysis where each investor from the earliest round 
was a separate observation.  In both cases, the results were qualitatively similar. We do not use the 
experience of venture capitalists who do not join the firm’s board, since it is standard practice for venture 
investors with significant equity stakes or involvement with the firm to join the board.   12
The regressions also include dummy variables for the round of the investment.  
Although we include each company only once (when the company shows up in the 
database for the first time), about 26% of the observations begin with rounds later than 
the first round. (In these instances, the firm raised an initial financing round from another 
investor, such as an individual angel.) All of the results are robust to including only 
companies where the first observation in the database is the first investment round.  We 
also include dummy variables for the company’s stage of development and the logarithm 
of company age in months.  Because success has been tied to location, we include a 
dummy variable for whether the firm was headquartered in California and one for 
whether it was headquartered in Massachusetts. We also include year and industry fixed 
effects.  Finally, because there is often more than one entrepreneur per company, there 
will be multiple observations per company.  Thus, robust standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates are calculated after clustering by company.  In later regressions, the 
unit of analysis will be the company.  
The first column of Table 5 reports one of the central findings of the paper.   The 
coefficient of LATER VENTURE is positive and statistically significant.  At the means of 
the other variables, entrepreneurs in their second or later ventures have a predicted 
success rate of 25.0%, while first-time entrepreneurs have a predicted success rate of 
20.8%.  
There are a number of hypotheses as to why the success rate of entrepreneurs in 
their second or later ventures is higher than the success rate of first-time entrepreneurs.  
One hypothesis is that there is learning-by-doing in entrepreneurship.  The experience of 
starting a new venture–successful or not–confers on entrepreneurs some benefits (skills,   13
contacts, ideas) that are useful in subsequent ventures.  (Such a hypothesis is consistent 
with Lazear’s (2005) finding that Stanford MBAs who ultimately become entrepreneurs 
follow more varied career paths than their classmates.) In this view, entrepreneurs can 
learn to succeed through the experience of having started a company regardless of what 
its ultimate performance is.  Alternatively, the higher average success rate of 
entrepreneurs in subsequent ventures could reflect a deeper pool of talented and hard-
working entrepreneurs.  We use the outcome of serial entrepreneurs' prior ventures to 
distinguish between these hypotheses. 
To determine whether a pure learning-by-doing effect exists, in the second 
column of Table 5 we add the dummy variable, PRIOR SUCCESS, which equals 1 if the 
prior venture of the serial entrepreneur was successful.  The estimated coefficient of this 
variable is positive and statistically significant.  Including it also lowers the coefficient of 
the LATER VENTURE dummy so that it is no longer statistically significant. The 
predicted success rate of entrepreneurs with a track record of success is 30.6%, compared 
to only 22.1% for serial entrepreneurs who failed in their prior venture, and 20.9% for 
first-time entrepreneurs.  This finding indicates that it is not experience per se that 
improves the odds of success for serial entrepreneurs. Instead, it suggests the importance 
of entrepreneurial skill in determining performance.  
The unit of analysis for the first two columns of Table 5 is the entrepreneur-
company level.  We also repeat the analysis using only one observation per company, 
accounting for any potential concerns about the independence of observations.  The third 
column of Table 5 reports the results of a regression in which the unit of analysis is the 
company, not the entrepreneur-company.  The key variables are 1) a dummy for whether   14
any of the founders is in their second or later ventures and 2) a dummy for whether any 
of the founders was successful in a prior venture. Here too a track record of prior success 
has a bigger effect on future success than does prior experience per se. Companies with a 
previously successful entrepreneur have a predicted success rate of 26.7%, whereas those 
with entrepreneurs who failed in prior ventures have an 17.9% success rate, and 
companies with first-time entrepreneurs have a 14.1% chance of success.  The effect of 
prior success on predicting future success is very large.   
The regressions also indicate that venture capital firm experience is positively 
related to success.  Using estimates from the third column of Table 5, at the 75
th 
percentile of VC EXPERIENCE and at the means of all the other variables, the predicted 
success rate is 19.0%, while at the 25
th percentile, the predicted success rate is only 
13.3%.  There are a number of reasons why more experienced venture capital firms may 
make more successful investments.  
To consider the importance of the VC firm in determining portfolio company 
success, we do a similar analysis on two levels.  In specification 4 of Table 5, we look at 
the data on an entrepreneur-company-VC firm level.  This allows us to fully consider 
variation in entrepreneur and VC firm characteristics.  To account for concerns about the 
independence of observations, specification 5 is at the company-VC firm level.   
In these specifications, we are using VC EXPERIENCE as an imperfect proxy for 
the quality of a venture capital firm.  If successful entrepreneurs are more likely to get 
funded by better venture capital firms, we could be getting a positive coefficient of 
PRIOR SUCCESS because it is a proxy for the unobservable components of venture 
capital firm quality that is not captured by VC EXPERIENCE. Thus, to control for   15
unobservable characteristics, we estimate the model with venture capital firm fixed 
effects. This enables us to estimate how well a given venture capital firm does on its 
investments in serial entrepreneurs relative to its other investments in first-time 
entrepreneurs.    Results in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 5 indicate that with 
venture capital firm fixed effects, the differential between first time entrepreneurs and 
successful serial entrepreneurs is even larger.   The fifth column, which estimates the 
effects at the company level, generates a predicted success rate for first-time 
entrepreneurs of 17.7%.  The predicted success rate for failed serial entrepreneurs in later 
ventures is 19.8%, and it is 29.6% for entrepreneurs with successful track records.  
Financing from experienced venture capital firms has a large effect on the 
probability that an entrepreneur succeeds for one of several reasons: because these firms 
are better able to screen for high quality entrepreneurs, because they are better monitors 
of entrepreneurs, or because they simply have access to the best deals.  But, if an 
entrepreneur already has a demonstrable track record of success, does a more 
experienced venture capital firm still enhance performance?  To answer this question, we 
add to the basic specification in column 2 and 3 of Table 5 an interaction term between 
VC EXPERIENCE and PRIOR SUCCESS, as well an interaction term between VC 
EXPERIENCE and LATER VENTURE.  
The results are reported in columns 6 and 7 of the table.  The coefficient of VC 
EXPERIENCE×PRIOR SUCCESS is negative and statistically significant (though 
somewhat more so in column 6).  This indicates that venture capital firm experience has a 
less positive effect on the performance of entrepreneurs with successful track records.  
Indeed, using estimates from column 7, the predicted success rate for previously   16
successful entrepreneurs is 28.1% when funded by more experienced venture capital 
firms (at the 75
th percentile of VC EXPERIENCE) and 27.7% when funded by less 
experienced venture capital firms (at the 25
th percentile of VC EXPERIENCE).  
Essentially, venture capital firm experience has a minimal effect on the performance of 
entrepreneurs with good track records.  Where venture capital firm experience does 
matter is in the performance of first-time entrepreneurs and serial entrepreneurs with 
histories of failure. First-time entrepreneurs have a 17.6% chance of succeeding when 
funded by more experienced venture capital firms and an 11.7% chance of succeeding 
when being funded by a less experienced venture capital firm.  Likewise, failed 
entrepreneurs who are funded by more experienced venture capital firms have a 22.1% 
chance of succeeding as compared to a 14.7% chance of succeeding when they are 
funded by less experienced venture capital firms.  
  These findings provide support for the view that venture capital firms actively 
screen and/or monitor their portfolio companies, and that there is some skill in doing so.  
When an entrepreneur has a proven track record of success–a publicly observable 
measure of quality–experienced venture capital firms are no better than others at 
determining whether he will succeed.  It is only when there are less clear measures of 
quality–an entrepreneur is starting a company for the first time, or an entrepreneur has 
actually failed in his prior venture–that more experienced venture capital firms have an 
advantage in identifying entrepreneurs who will succeed.  To use a sports analogy, all 
general managers of teams in the National Football League (NFL) probably agree that 
superstar quarterback Tom Brady of the New England Patriots would be a valuable 
addition to their teams.   But, NFL teams were much less optimistic about his prospects   17
in 2000 when the Patriots drafted him in the sixth round.  The football equivalent of our 
finding would be that teams with a more experienced staff (such as the Patriots) are better 
at identifying diamonds-in-the-rough such as Tom Brady when they are in the draft, but 
no better at determining their worth once they are proven superstars.
5  
The results are also consistent with the view that venture capitalists actively 
monitor their portfolio firms or add value through a variety of means such as executive 
recruiting and customer contacts.   Previously successful entrepreneurs–who presumably 
need less monitoring and value-added services–do not benefit as much from this sort of 
venture capital firm monitoring and expertise.  By way of contrast, the evidence suggests 
that first-time entrepreneurs and those with a track record of failure are more likely to 
benefit from venture capital firm expertise.  To continue the football analogy, Tom Brady 
would benefit less from a high-quality football coach now than he did when he was first 
drafted.   
Table 6 provides additional supporting evidence for the view that more 
experienced venture capital firms are better able to identify and/or develop 
entrepreneurial skill.  Here, we analyze the sample of first-time entrepreneurs to 
determine the factors that lead them to become serial entrepreneurs. The dependent 
variable is equal to one if the entrepreneur subsequently starts another venture.  The 
logistic regression reported in the first column in the table indicates that first-time 
entrepreneurs funded by more experienced venture capital firms are more likely to 
become serial entrepreneurs.  At the 25
th percentile of experience, there is a 4.8% chance 
                                                 
5Massey and Thaler (2006) present strong evidence that high first-round NFL draft picks are overvalued 
relative to later picks.  Although they interpret their findings as evidence of a behavioral bias, it is also 
possible that less experienced general managers (who run lower quality teams and get to pick early in the 
first round) have a harder time assessing quality.    18
that an entrepreneur will start another venture, whereas at the 75
th percentile, there is a 
5.7% probability.  Though the increase is small on an absolute basis, given the low 
baseline rates of serial entrepreneurship, the effect is quite big.    
B. Valuation 
We now examine how serial entrepreneurship and venture capital firm experience 
affect company valuations.
6 To analyze this question, we use first-round “pre-money” 
valuation as our valuation measure. Venture Source calculates this as the product of the 
price paid per share in the round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round.
7  
The pre-money valuation is the perceived net present value of the company, and therefore 
excludes the additional capital raised in the financing.  
  A company’s valuation depends on numerous factors including those we can 
(imperfectly) observe (e.g., the stage of product development, company age, industry, 
location, public market valuation levels, entrepreneur’s quality, and venture capital firm’s 
quality) and those we cannot (e.g., the company’s sales and assets). We are mainly 
interested in how measures of entrepreneur quality and venture capital firm quality affect 
pre-money valuation.  
Table 7 presents the results of regressing the natural log of real pre-money 
valuation (expressed in millions of year 2000 dollars) on the above observables.  Because 
the data include significant outliers (one valuation exceeds $600 million), we winsorize 
the dependent variable at the 99
th percentile ($131.5 million), which is more than 15 
                                                 
6Hsu (2004) shows that entrepreneurs have to pay more (i.e., to accept a lower valuation) to be financed by 
venture capitalists with better track records.  
7Almost all venture capital financings use convertible preferred stock.  This methodology for calculation 
pre-money valuation implicitly assumes that the value of preferred stock’s liquidation preference is zero.  
Thus, this common approach to calculating pre-money valuation overstates the true valuation.  This bias is 
unlikely to vary systematically with the variables we are using in our regression analysis.      19
times the median.   All the regressions include industry and year fixed effects.   We again 
consider specifications at the entrepreneur-company level (1, 2 and 6), company level (3 
and 7), the entrepreneur-company-VC firm level (4), and the company-VC firm level (5). 
Before describing our main results, it is worth pointing out that the controls all have the 
predicted sign.  Older firms and those at later stages of product development have higher 
valuations.  In addition, when public market industry valuations are higher, venture 
capital valuations are also higher.  The public market industry valuation is calculated as 
the average market-to-book equity ratio for publicly traded firms in the same industry.
8 
Finally, firms located in California have slightly higher valuations than those in other 
states and firms located in Massachusetts have somewhat lower valuations, but these 
differences are not statistically significant.   
Of more interest is the finding that venture capital firm experience is positively 
related to pre-money valuation.  The effect, however, is modest.  The elasticity is 
approximately 9.2%.  For example, the estimates from column 3 of Table 7 imply that at 
the 75
th percentile of VC EXPERIENCE, the forecasted valuation is $10.49 million, 
whereas at the 25
th, it is $8.92 million.  That more experienced firms pay more for new 
ventures is not surprising, given that they have higher success rates.  Because there are 
                                                 
8In order to do this we need to link the SIC codes of public companies to the nine industries used in our 
analysis. Our procedure is to identify the SIC codes of all venture capital-backed firms that went public 
within a given Venture Economics industry code.  Because there are multiple SIC codes associated with 
each of our nine industries, we construct market-to-book ratios as a weighted average of the market-to-
book ratios of the public companies in those SIC codes, where the weights are the relative fractions of 
firms that went public within our nine industries.  For each of the public firms assigned to the industry, we 
compute the ratio of shareholders’ equity to the market value of the equity at the beginning of the quarter.  
If multiple classes of common and preferred stock were outstanding, the combined value of all classes is 
used.  In many industries, numerous small firms with significant negative earnings introduce a substantial 
skewness to the distribution of these ratios.  Consequently, we weighted the average by equity market 
capitalization at the beginning of the quarter. 
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unobservable firm characteristics that affect valuation levels (or those that are measured 
with error), it is likely that VC EXPERIENCE serves as a proxy for the characteristics 
that increase firm value.  These characteristics, such as the quality of the entrepreneur, 
might be unobservable to less experienced venture capital firms.  Alternatively, 
characteristics such as sales or assets could be observable to market participants, but 
unobservable to us given the data we have.  If more experienced venture capital firms 
invest in more mature firms in ways we do not fully capture with our company stage 
controls, this could explain our finding.   
The finding that new ventures funded by more experienced venture capital firms 
invest at higher pre-money valuations needs to be reconciled with Hsu’s (2004) finding 
that more experienced venture capital firms make offers at lower pre-money valuations.  
Hsu examines a sample of new ventures that received competing offers from venture 
capital firms.  To the extent that more experienced venture capital firms add more value 
to new ventures (as is consistent with our findings), they would require larger equity 
stakes (lower share prices) in exchange for their money and their value-added services.  
Thus, the offers from top-tier ventures capital firms should imply lower pre-money 
valuations even though the companies are worth more if funded by them.  Because Hsu is 
looking at within-venture offers, he is controlling for the quality of the venture.  He is 
therefore able to isolate the effect of venture capital firm quality on valuations.  Because 
we are looking across ventures, we are picking up the effect identified by Hsu as well as 
the between-venture differences in quality.  This may explain why the estimated effect is 
small.     21
Somewhat surprisingly, in the first two columns of Table 7 we find no 
relationship between pre-money valuation and LATER VENTURE and PRIOR SUCCESS.  
The same is true when we conduct the analysis at the company level (column 3) and 
include venture capital firm fixed effects (columns 4 and 5).  Given the higher success 
rates of previously successful entrepreneurs, one would have thought that firms 
associated with these entrepreneurs would have had higher valuations.  Apparently this is 
not the case, which suggests that venture capital firms are able to buy equity in firms 
started by previously successful entrepreneurs at a discount.   
The last two columns of Table 7 add interactions of VC EXPERIENCE with 
measures of PRIOR SUCCESS and LATER VENTURE.   The coefficient of the 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant only at the five percent level. This 
suggests that top-tier venture capital firms are not as eager to pay for prior performance, 
but the magnitude of the effect is small.    
This result is consistent with the results of Kaplan and Stromberg (2003).  Kaplan 
and Stromberg examine venture capital contractual terms and find that repeat 
entrepreneurs receive more favorable terms for vesting, board structure, liquidation 
rights, and the tranching of capital, but did not receive greater equity ownership 
percentages.  It therefore appears that serial entrepreneurs may extract greater value from 
venture capitalists in the non-price terms of investment. 
The overall conclusion that we draw from Table 7 is that despite the higher 
success rates of entrepreneurs with successful track records, venture capital firms are not 
paying premiums to invest in their companies.  Why successful entrepreneurs appear   22
unable to capture an increasing share of rents is something of a mystery, but it has 
implications for returns.     
C. Returns  
In this section, we investigate whether venture capital firms earn higher returns on 
their investments in serial entrepreneurs.   Unfortunately, we do not observe actual rates 
of return on venture capital investments.
9  What we can observe, with varying degrees of 
accuracy, is company valuations at the time of exit.  Venture Economics and Venture 
Source provide this information for most IPOs and some acquisitions.  For companies 
missing information in these databases, we search for valuation at the time of IPO in 
SDC Corporate New Issues database.  We also searched for acquisition values using 
Factiva. If the firm did not go public by December 2003, we assume that the exit value is 
zero.  We exclude from the analysis firms that went public or were acquired where we 
could not find the valuation. 
Our crude measure of return is the ratio of the exit valuation to pre-money 
valuation in the first financing round with venture investors, what we refer to as the 
investment multiple.  The investment multiple is likely to be correlated with actual 
returns but it does not adjust for two critical elements of return:  the time it takes to exit 
and the dilution that occurs over financing rounds.   
Table 8 presents regression results in which the dependent variable is the 
investment multiple divided by the average investment multiple of firms funded in the 
same industry and year.  We refer to this variable as the relative investment multiple.  
                                                 
9Venture capitalists typically invest in multiple financing rounds. Even if we know that a given venture 
firm invested in a certain round, it is often unclear what percentage of the equity sold in the financed the 
venture capitalist received. This information is needed to compute a rate of return.   23
When the relative investment multiple is one, the investment multiple on the venture 
capital firm’s investment is equal to the industry-year average.   
The regressors include the same set of variables we have been considering 
throughout.  The first column indicates that the relative investment multiple is greater for 
firms with serial entrepreneurs, although the effect is not statistically significant.  The 
effect is larger for serial entrepreneurs who previously succeeded, as results reported in 
the second column indicate. The estimated effect is statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Finally, venture capital experience is positively related to the 
relative investment multiple.   
The estimates from the third column of Table 8 imply that among companies 
funded by inexperienced venture capital firms, only those with previously successful 
entrepreneurs do better than the industry-year average investment multiple (79% higher 
on average).  First time and failed entrepreneurs do significantly worse than the average.  
By contrast, when companies are funded by top-tier venture capital firms, they perform 
in general at the industry average and do significantly better if one of the entrepreneurs 
has a successful track record (107% greater).   
The last column of Table 8 looks at relative investment multiples, conditional on 
the venture succeeding.  Prior success and venture capital experience have no appreciable 
effect on relative investment valuation.  This indicates that the higher returns documented 
in the first four columns of the Table 8 come from higher success rates, not greater 
returns in the IPOs.   
Finally, we try to connect our deal-level results to venture capital fund internal 
rates of return.  Our source of return data is the 2004 Private Equity Performance   24
Monitor, which presents return data on over 1,700 private equity funds.  This information 
is compiled by Mark O’Hare, who over the past five years has created a database of 
returns from public sources (e.g., institutional investors who have posted their returns 
online), Freedom of Information Act requests to public funds, and voluntary disclosures 
by both general and limited partners. In order to do this mapping, we need to make some 
assumptions. (For instance, because Mayfield V was raised in 1984 and Mayfield VI in 
1988, we attribute all investments made between 1984 and 1987 to Mayfield V.)   
Our dependent variable is fund internal rate of return (IRR) measured in percent.   
(For example, a 60% return gets entered into the data as 60.)   The average fund IRR is 
13.8%. We include a series of controls including industry shares in the portfolio of the 
fund, year dummies for the year the fund was established, and assets under management 
at the time the fund was raised. 
Our main independent variables of interest are the portion of a fund’s deals that 
involve serial entrepreneurs and the portion that involve successful serial entrepreneurs.  
The results in Table 9 are quite strong and demonstrate the impact that serial 
entrepreneurs can have on portfolio returns. At the 25
th return percentile, 6.8% of venture 
capital funds are investments in companies with serial entrepreneurs; at the 75
th 
percentile, it is 18.2%.   The coefficient of 59.2 in column 2 implies a 7.3% greater IRR 
for funds that invest in serial entrepreneurs.  However, there appears to be no link to the 
share of the fund invested in previously successful entrepreneurs.  The estimated effects 
of experience are also large.  Top-tier firms are predicted to have IRRs of 45.4%, as 
compared to 14.3% for less experienced venture capital firms.   
 
4. Conclusions   25
This paper examines the role that skill plays in the success of entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists.  By examining the experience of serial entrepreneurs and the venture 
capitalists that fund them, we are able to provide insights into how important each is and 
what type of skill each possesses.  Our results indicate that skill is an important 
determinant of success for entrepreneurial startups.  Successful serial entrepreneurs are 
more likely to replicate the success of their past companies than either single venture 
entrepreneurs or serial entrepreneurs who failed in their prior venture.   
More experienced venture capital firms are also shown to have higher success 
rates on their investments.  However, this is isolated to first time entrepreneurs and those 
who previously failed.  When experienced and inexperienced venture capital firms invest 
in entrepreneurs with a track record of success, there is no performance differential.  This 
evidence would seem to suggest that prior success is a signal of quality or that venture 
capital firms add little value to talented, successful entrepreneurs.  If prior success were 
pure luck, we would not see this pattern.    
While they are more likely to be successful, serial entrepreneurs are not able to 
extract all of the value from their superior ability.  We find that successful serial 
entrepreneurs do not achieve higher valuations than do other entrepreneurs.
10  This leads 
to higher deal returns for venture capitalists who invest in companies started by 
successful serial entrepreneurs.  Investing in serial entrepreneurs also leads to higher 
rates of return of the funds themselves.   
Our paper raises several interesting questions for future research.  First, while our 
paper identifies entrepreneurial skill, it does not distinguish exactly what the critical 
                                                 
10 We are unable to determine the value implications of the non-price terms in Kaplan and Stromberg 
(2003) because we do not have the actual financing documents.   26
entrepreneurial skill is.  It is possible that entrepreneurial skill is embodied in the 
networks with customers, suppliers, and other market participants that enhance the 
outcomes of serial entrepreneurs.  It is also possible that the skill is greater ability to 
identify markets, set strategy, and correctly analyze various business problems.  In future 
work, we hope to examine the markets that serial entrepreneurs enter and to identify 
whether future success is confined to the markets where they have operated in the past or 
whether successful serial entrepreneurs are also more successful in new markets. 
While not ruling it out, our results are less consistent with the learning by doing 
work of Eesley and Roberts (2006a,b).  A learning-by-doing story would need to explain 
why there is differential learning between successful and unsuccessful serial 
entrepreneurs as well as why more experienced venture capitalists can identify failed 
serial entrepreneurs who “learned” in their previous venture. 
The results in this paper also highlight the role of venture capital skill in 
identifying talented entrepreneurs and attractive markets.  We do not, however, identify 
whether this ability operates at the individual or the firm level.  Similarly, we do not 
know whether various attributes of the individual general partners or the firms 
themselves are also associated with greater ability to identify successful investments.  In 
future work, we plan to look at how demographic characteristics of individual general 
partners and characteristics of venture capital teams affect the success of venture capital 
investments.   27
 
References 
Bengtsson, Ola, Repeat Relationships between Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs, 
Unpublished working paper, University of Chicago, 2005. 
 
Bengtsson, Ola, Investor Attitudes and the Supply of Capital: Are Venture Capitalists in 
California More Forgiving?, Unpublished working paper, University of Chicago, 2006. 
 
Bhide, Amar, The Origin and Evolution of New Businesses. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 2000. 
 
Carroll, Glenn R., and Elaine Mosakowski, The Career Dynamics of Self-Employment, 
Administrative Science Quarterly 32. 1987. 570-589.  
 
Chatterji, Aaron K., Spawned with a Silver Spoon? Entrepreneurial Performance and 
Innovation in the Medical Device Industry, Unpublished Working Paper, University of 
California at Berkeley, 2005.  
 
Eesley, Charles, and Edward Roberts, Cutting Your Teeth: Learning from Rare 
Experiences, Unpublished working paper, MIT, 2006a. 
 
Eesley, Charles, and Edward Roberts, The Second Time Around?: Serial Entrepreneurs 
From MIT, Unpublished working paper, MIT, 2006b. 
 
Gompers, Paul, Anna Kovner, Josh Lerner, and David Scharfstein, Specialization and 
Success: Evidence from Venture Capital, Unpublished working paper, Harvard 
University, 2006. 
 
Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle. 2
nd edition. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 2004. 
 
Gompers, Paul, Josh Lerner, and David Scharfstein, Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public 
Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986 to 1999, Journal of Finance 60. 
2005. 577-614. 
 
Hochberg, Yael, Alexander Ljungqvist, and Yang Lu, Whom You Know Matters: 
Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance, Journal of Finance 
Forthcoming. 2006.  
 
Honig, Benson, and Per Davidsson, Nascent Entrepreneurship, Social Networks and 
Organizational Learning, Paper presented at the Competence 2000, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
Hsu, David H., What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation? Journal of 
Finance 59. 2004. 1805-1844 
   28
Kaplan, Steven N., and Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, 
Persistence and Capital, Journal of Finance 60. 2005. 1791-1823. 
 
Kaplan, Steven N., Berk A. Sensoy, and Per Strömberg, What are Firms? Evolution from 
Birth to Public Companies, Unpublished working paper, University of Chicago, 2006. 
 
Kaplan, Steven N., and Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: Evidence from Venture Capital Contracts, Review of Economic Studies 70. 2003. 
281-316. 
 
Kihlstrom, Richard, and Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial 
Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, Journal of Political Economy 87. 
1979. 719-748. 
 
Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit.  New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 
1921. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Knight/knRUP8.html>. 
 
Lazear, Edward P., Entrepreneurship, Journal of Labor Economics 23. 2005. 649-680.  
 
Massey, Cade, and Richard H. Thaler, Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the 
National Football League, Working paper no. 11270, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 2006.  
 
Reuber, Rebecca, Lorraine Dyke, and Eileen Fischer, The Impact of Entrepreneurial 
Teams on the Financing Experiences of Canadian Ventures, Journal of Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship 7. 1990.  13-22. 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press. 1934.  
 
Sorensen, Morten, How Smart is Smart Money? A Two-Sided Matching Model of 
Venture Capital, Unpublished working paper, University of Chicago, 2004. 
 
Sorenson, Olav, and Toby Stuart, Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of 
Venture Capital Investments. American Journal of Sociology. 106. 2001. 1546-1586.   29
 
Table 1: Frequency of Serial Entrepreneurs by Year   
           
    Serial Entrepreneurs as   
Year  Serial Entrepreneurs  Total Entrepreneurs  a Percent of Total   
1980 0  11  0.0   
1981 0  7  0.0   
1982 0  11  0.0   
1983 0  34  0.0   
1984 2  29  6.9   
1985 3  42  7.1   
1986 9  99  9.1   
1987 9  130  6.9   
1988 10  209  4.8   
1989 14  254  5.5   
1990 35  301  11.6   
1991 34  337  10.1   
1992 53  522  10.2   
1993 65  516  12.6   
1994 78  574  13.6   
1995 129  1,051  12.3   
1996 166  1,262  13.2   
1997 141  1,205  11.7   
1998 164  1,256  13.1   
1999 174  1,678  10.4   
2000 38  404  9.4   
Sample includes one observation per entrepreneur - company pair. 
 Table 2: Frequency of Serial Entrepreneurs by Industry 
    
           
         Serial Entrepreneurs as    
   Serial Entrepreneurs   Total Entrepreneurs   a Percent of Total     
Internet and Computers  556  4,489  12.4   
Communications and Electronics  157  1,424  11.0   
Business and Industrial  2  109  1.8   
Consumer 29  576  5.0   
Energy 0  19  0.0   
Biotech and Healthcare  271  1,964  13.8   
Financial Services  11  163  6.7   
Business Services  68  827  8.2   
Other 30  361  8.3     
Sample includes one observation per entrepreneur - company pair. 
   2
Table 3: Frequency of Serial Entrepreneurs by Venture Capital Firm 
 
   Serial  Total  Serial Entrepreneurs as   Ranking by:   
Year Entrepreneurs    Entrepreneurs  a  Percent of Total   Number  Percent    
Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers  100  666  15.0  1  9   
New Enterprise Associates  80  702  11.4  2  28   
Sequoia Capital  69  432  16.0  3  5   
U.S. Venture Partners  68  454  15.0  4  10   
Mayfield 63  459  13.7  5  19   
Accel Partners  61  418  14.6  6  13   
Crosspoint Venture Partners  60  407  14.7  7  11   
Institutional Venture Partners  56  385  14.5  8  14   
Bessemer Venture Partners  49  340  14.4  9  16   
Matrix Partners  44  275  16.0  10  4   
Menlo Ventures  43  305  14.1  11  17   
Sprout Group  42  315  13.3  12  21   
Brentwood Associates  40  265  15.1  14  8   
Venrock Associates  40  389  10.3  13  31   
Mohr Davidow Ventures  38  251  15.1  16  6   
Oak Investment Partners  38  462  8.2  15  39   
Domain Associates  37  210  17.6  17  1   
Benchmark Capital  36  264  13.6  19  20   
Greylock Partners  36  374  9.6  18  34   
InterWest Partners  35  312  11.2  20  29   
Advent International  33  238  13.9  21  18   
Foundation Capital  31  188  16.5  24  2   
Enterprise Partners Venture Capital  31  215  14.4  23  15   
Canaan Partners  31  252  12.3  22  23   
Delphi Ventures  30  185  16.2  26  3   
Sigma Partners  30  204  14.7  25  12   
Charles River Ventures  29  192  15.1  27  7   
Norwest Venture Partners  27  231  11.7  28  25   
Austin Ventures  25  270  9.3  29  36   
Morgan Stanley Venture Partners  24  191  12.6  34  22   
Lightspeed Venture Partners  24  202  11.9  33  24   
Sutter Hill Ventures  24  207  11.6  32  26   
Battery Ventures  24  242  9.9  31  33   
Sevin Rosen Funds  24  254  9.4  30  35   
JPMorgan Partners  23  225  10.2  36  32   
St. Paul Venture Capital  23  277  8.3  35  38   
Alta Partners  22  190  11.6  37  27   
Morgenthaler 20  183  10.9  38  30   
Trinity Ventures  18  214  8.4  39  37   
Warburg Pincus  16  195  8.2  40  40   
 
Sample includes one observation per VC firm-portfolio company. Includes the 40 VC firms with the most 
total deals in the sample.   3
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics            
               
   All First 
Entrepreneurs 
with One  Serial Entrepreneurs      
   Ventures  Venture  First Venture  Later Ventures   
Success Rate  0.253  0.243  0.369 ***  0.290 ***  
Pre-Money Valuation (millions of 2000 $)  15.95  15.78  17.75  *  12.30  ***   
Firm in Startup Stage  0.116  0.118  0.090  **  0.175  ***   
Firm in Development Stage  0.294  0.294  0.293    0.377  ***   
Firm in Beta Stage  0.039  0.039  0.037    0.045     
Firm in Shipping Stage  0.469  0.470  0.462    0.362  ***   
Firm in Profitable Stage  0.073  0.070  0.101  **  0.036  ***   
Firm in Re-Start Stage  0.009  0.009  0.016    0.006     
California-Based  Company  0.430  0.417  0.578 ***  0.591 ***  
Massachusetts-Based  Company  0.119  0.119  0.122   0.119    
Age of Firm (in Months)  36.64  36.30  40.54  **  20.60  ***   
Previous Deals by VC Firm  51.35  51.76  46.70  ***  58.86  ***   
Previous Deals by VC Firm Relative to Year 
Average  2.896  2.887  2.989   3.290 ***  
One observation per entrepreneur-company pair. 




Table 5: Venture Success Rates                       
                       
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)    
   Probit     Probit     Probit     Probit     Probit     Probit     Probit    
LATER  VENTURE  0.0411    0.0126       0.0017       0.0069      
  (2.92)  ***  (0.73)       (0.09)       (0.34)      
PRIOR  SUCCESS      0.0830       0.0992       0.1252      
      (2.93)  ***     (3.04)  ***     (3.68)  ***    
Any Entrepreneur In LATER VENTURE          0.0384        0.0222        0.0362   
         (2.21)  **     (1.01)       (1.65)  * 
Any Entrepreneur Has PRIOR SUCCESS          0.0808        0.0939        0.1198   
         (3.12)  ***     (2.90)  ***     (3.66)  *** 
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE  0.0381    0.0379    0.0357            0.0391    0.0399   
  (4.51) *** (4.49)  ***  (5.82)  ***        (4.56)  ***  (5.52)  *** 
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X LATER VENTURE                      0.0079       
                   ( 0 . 5 1 )       
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X PRIOR SUCCESS                      -0.0453       
                   (2.02)  **    
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X Any Entrepreneur                         0.0027   
In  Later  Venture                      (0.16)   
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X Any Entrepreneur                         -0.0404   
Has  PRIOR  SUCCESS                      (1.87)  * 
Logarithm of Age of Company  0.0060    0.0061    0.0084    0.0086    0.0024    0.0060    0.0082   
  (0.89)    (0.90)    (1.70) *  (1.03)   (0.37)   (0.89)   (1.68) * 
California-Based  Company  0.0249    0.0249   0.0029   0.0183   -0.0066   0.0249   0.0024   
  (1.33)    (1.33)   (0.21)   (0.75)   (0.34)   (1.33)   (0.17)   
Massachusetts-Based  Company  -0.0616    -0.0610   -0.0415   -0.1039   -0.0681   -0.0617   -0.0436   
  (2.38)  **  (2.36)  **  (2.24) **  (3.24) ***  (2.61) ***  (2.39) **  (2.37) ** 
Company In Development Stage  0.0175    0.0168    0.0304    0.0183    0.0544    0.0171    0.0305   
  (0.58)    (0.56)   (1.39)   (0.55)   (2.05)  **  (0.57)   (1.40)   
Company  In  Beta  Stage  0.0402    0.0403   0.0691   0.0476   0.1202   0.0411   0.0702   
  (0.78)    (0.78)    (1.78) *  (0.93)   (2.79)   (0.80)   (1.81) *   2
Company In Shipping Stage  0.0659    0.0657    0.0671    0.0982    0.1282    0.0664    0.0677   
  (2.06)  **  (2.06)  **  (2.92) ***  (2.79) ***  (4.56) ***  (2.08) **  (2.94) *** 
Company In Profitable Stage  0.1784    0.1789    0.2269    0.1814    0.2672    0.1798    0.2278   
  (3.49)  ***  (3.50) *** (5.40)  *** (2.99)  *** (5.26)  *** (3.51)  *** (5.41)  *** 
Company In Re-Start Stage  -0.0163    -0.0138    -0.0554    -0.0040    0.0133    -0.0128    -0.0541   
  (0.15)    (0.13)   (0.76)   (0.04)   (0.15)   (0.12)   (0.74)   
Company  Stage  Missing  0.1057    0.1061   0.1453   0.2929   0.2891   0.1082   0.1500   
  (1.96)  *  (1.97)  **  (3.31) ***  (4.07) ***  (4.46) ***  (2.00) **  (3.39) *** 
                       
Controls  for:                       
Round  Number  yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Year  yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Industry  yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
VC Firm Fixed Effects  no    no    no    yes    yes    no    no   
                        
Log-likelihood  -4872.2    -4867.7   -1635.5   -9568.9   -2805.8   -4865.5   -1632.9   
χ
2-Statistic 
373.1    376.9    536.7   1008.7   1034.9    379.4    535.7   
p-Value  0.000    0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Observations  9,876    9,876    3,831    19,617     6,180     9,876    3,831    
 
The sample consists of 9,932 ventures by 8,808 entrepreneurs covering the years 1975 to 2000.  The dependent variable is Success, an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the portfolio 
company went public and zero otherwise.  LATER VENTURE is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  
PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero 
otherwise.  Any Entrepreneur in Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  
Any Entrepreneur with Prior Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go 
public by December 2003 and zero otherwise.  VC FIRM EXPERIENCE is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average 
in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t.  The sample analyzed in columns 1, 2, and 6 is at the entrepreneur-company level, the sample analyzed in columns 3 and 7 is 
at the company level, the sample analyzed in column 4 is at the entrepreneur-company-VC firm level, and the sample analyzed in column 5 is at the company-VC firm level. 
Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.                     
 Table 6: Probability of Becoming a Serial Entrepreneur      
        
   (1)     (2)    
   Probit     Probit    
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE  0.0058    0.0058   
 (2.57)  **  (2.53)  ** 
PRIOR SUCCESS      0.0009   
     (0.17)   
Logarithm of Age of Company  0.0036    0.0036   
 (1.75)  *  (1.75)  * 
California-Based Company  0.0347    0.0347   
 (6.47)  ***  (6.46)  *** 
Massachusetts-Based Company 0.0193    0.0194   
 (2.18)  **  (2.19)  ** 
Company In Development Stage  0.0122    0.0122   
 (1.29)    (1.28)   
Company In Beta Stage  0.0058    0.0058   
 (0.40)    (0.40)   
Company In Shipping Stage  0.0141    0.0141   
 (1.47)    (1.47)   
Company In Profitable Stage  0.0032    0.0031   
 (0.26)    (0.25)   
Company In Re-Start Stage  -0.0086    -0.0085   
 (0.41)    (0.41)   
Company Stage Missing  0.0262    0.0261   
 (1.75)  *  (1.75)  * 
Controls for:         
Round Number  yes    yes   
Year yes    yes   
Industry yes    yes   
        
Log-likelihood -2145.5    -2145.5   
χ
2-Statistic  563.6   564.4   
p-Value  0.000   0.000   
Observations 8,734    8,734     
The sample consists of 8,808 initial ventures by entrepreneurs covering the years 1975 to 2000.  The 
dependent variable is Become Serial, an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the entrepreneur 
begins a second venture and zero otherwise.  VC FIRM EXPERIENCE is the difference between the log 
of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in 
year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t.  PRIOR SUCCESS is an 
indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur's first venture-backed company went 
public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise. 
Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 Table 7: Pre-Money Valuations                       
                       
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)    
   OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS    
LATER  VENTURE  -0.0290   -0.0245       0.0144       -0.0210      
  (0.97)   (0.66)       (0.46)       (0.45)      
PRIOR  SUCCESS    -0.0132      -0.0726      0.0671      
     (0.23)       (1.31)       (0.90)       
Any  Entrepreneur  In  LATER  VENTURE       -0.0260      -0.0112      -0.0176   
        (0.60)       (0.28)       (0.31)   
Any  Entrepreneur  Has  PRIOR  SUCCESS       0.0065      -0.0351      0.1204   
        (0.11)       (0.58)       (1.50)   
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  0.0916   0.0916   0.1149           0.0965   0.1344  
  (4.88) *** (4.88) *** (7.12) ***          (5.09) *** (7.12) *** 
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  X  LATER  VENTURE                -0.0050      
                 ( 0 . 1 5 )       
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  X  PRIOR  SUCCESS                -0.0926      
                 (1.75)  *    
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  X  Any  Entrepreneur                       -0.0135   
In  Later  Venture                     (0.31)   
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  X  Any  Entrepreneur                       -0.1382   
Has  PRIOR  SUCCESS                     (2.34)  ** 
Logarithm  of  Age  of  Company  0.0889   0.0889   0.0927   0.0396   0.0543   0.0886   0.0916   
  (4.94) *** (4.93) *** (5.82) *** (3.77) *** (3.08) *** (4.92) *** (5.76) *** 
California-Based  Company  0.0771   0.0771   0.0629   0.0576   0.0195   0.0771   0.0611   
  (1.87) *  (1.87) *  (1.69) *  (2.29) **  (0.47)   (1.87) *  (1.64)  
Massachusetts-Based  Company  -0.0554   -0.0555   -0.0715   -0.1195   -0.1312   -0.0575   -0.0800   
  (0.95)   (0.95)   (1.42)   (3.46)   (2.53) **  (0.99)   (1.60)  
Company  In  Development  Stage  0.4787   0.4788   0.4366   0.7874   0.6834   0.4794   0.4367   
  (8.28) *** (8.28) *** (8.71) ***  (19.28)  ***  (10.77)  *** (8.29) *** (8.70) *** 
Company  In  Beta  Stage  0.6504   0.6503   0.6652   1.1635   1.0595   0.6509   0.6661   
  (6.17) *** (6.17) *** (7.32) ***  (19.80)  ***  (11.83)  *** (6.18) *** (7.37) *** 
Company  In  Shipping  Stage  0.9070   0.9070   0.8456   1.2609   1.1157   0.9078   0.8468     2
  (14.02) *** (14.02) *** (14.48) *** (28.84) *** (16.19) *** (14.05) *** (14.49) *** 
Company  In  Profitable  Stage  1.3444   1.3442   1.3231   1.8374   1.6150   1.3451   1.3247   
  (12.92) *** (12.91) *** (13.16) *** (28.27) *** (14.51) *** (12.93) *** (13.21) *** 
Company  In  Re-Start  Stage  -0.5520   -0.5524   -0.5416   0.2357   0.0529   -0.5501   -0.5322  
  (2.29) **  (2.29) **  (2.45) **  (2.29) **  (0.22)   (2.28) **  (2.41) ** 
Company  Stage  Missing  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   
Logarithm  of  Value-Weighted  Industry  Index  0.4467   0.4465   0.3532   0.2684   0.1682   0.4472   0.3572   
  (4.32) **  (4.32) **  (3.80) **  (3.95) **  (1.61)   (4.33) **  (3.86) ** 
                        
C o n t r o l s   f o r :                        
Round  Number  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Year  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
Industry  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   
VC  Firm  Fixed  Effects  no   no   no   yes   yes   no   no  
                        
R-squared  0.36   0.36   0.35   0.56   0.56   0.36   0.35  
Observations  6,377   6,377   2,348   15,670      4,912     6,377     2,348    
The sample consists of 6,418 professional venture financings of privately held firms between 1975 and 2000 in the Venture Source database for which the firm was able to determine the valuation of the 
financing round.  The dependent variable is natural logarithm of Pre-Money Valuation, defined as the product of the price paid per share in the financing round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing 
round, expressed in millions of current dollars. Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  
PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero 
otherwise.  Any Entrepreneur in Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  
Any Entrepreneur with Prior Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the company started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public 
by December 2003 and zero otherwise.  VC FIRM EXPERIENCE is the difference between the log of the number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of 
the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t.  The sample analyzed in columns 1, 2, and 6 is at the entrepreneur-company level, the sample analyzed in columns 3 and 7 is at the company 
level, the sample analyzed in column 4 is at the entrepreneur-company-VC firm level, and the sample analyzed in column 5 is at the company-VC firm level. 
Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.              
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%  and  10%  level,  respectively.                  
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Table 8: Venture Returns                            
                            
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     (7)     (8)    
   OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS     OLS    
LATER  VENTURE  0.3429   0.0883    0.1228       -0.3030   0.1845   0.0163    0.1536   
  (1.63)   (0.36)    (0.54)       (1.93) *  (1.41)   (0.12)    (0.86)   
PRIOR  SUCCESS     0.7799   0.8278      1.4183       0.4238   0.3159   
     (1.46)   (1.66)  *    (2.77)  ***    (1.37)   (0.91)   
ANY ENTREPRENEUR IN LATER VENTURE              0.3823                   
           (1.39)                 
ANY  ENTREPRENEUR  HAS  PRIOR  SUCCESS           0.8185                 
           (1.64)                 
VC  FIRM  EXPERIENCE  0.1531    0.1515   0.1594   0.2285   0.2089   -0.1216   
-
0.1187   -0.1076  
  (1.73) *  (1.71)  *  (1.80) *  (2.29) **  (1.93) *  (1.63)   (1.59)    (1.41)   
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X LATER VENTURE          -0.0546        0.0224            -0.1387   
        (0.28)      (0.17)          (1.18)   
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X PRIOR SUCCESS          -0.0555        -0.0591            0.1012   
        (0.16)      (0.16)          (0.40)   
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X Any Entrepreneur               -0.0892                   
In  Later  Venture           (0.34)                 
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE X Any Entrepreneur               0.0359                   
Has  PRIOR  SUCCESS           (0.09)                 
Logarithm  of  Age  of  Company  -0.1371   -0.1373    -0.1376   -0.1084   -0.0712   -0.2048  
-
0.2023   -0.2023  
  (2.23) **  (2.23)  **  (2.22) **  (1.60)   (1.18)   (3.36) ***  (3.31)  ***  (3.30)  *** 
California-Based  Company  0.3013   0.3024    0.3021   0.1221   0.2886   0.0169   0.0126    0.0146   
  (1.23)   (1.23)    (1.23)   (0.48)   (0.96)   (0.08)   (0.06)    (0.07)   
Massachusetts-Based  Company  -0.1708    -0.1634   -0.1643   -0.1585   -0.0815    0.0258    0.0277   0.0247   
  (0.68)   (0.65)    (0.66)   (0.54)   (0.26)   (0.09)   (0.09)    (0.08)   
Company  In  Development  Stage  -0.3487   -0.3519    -0.3521   -0.1943   -0.2974   -1.1035  
-
1.1169   -1.1208  
  (0.80)   (0.81)    (0.81)   (0.41)   (0.61)   (2.05) **  (2.07)  ** (2.07)  **   4
Company  In  Beta  Stage  -0.9392   -0.9333    -0.9346   -0.7156   -1.0589   -1.7482  
-
1.7498   -1.7495  
  (2.23) **  (2.21)  **  (2.21) **  (1.57)   (2.28) **  (3.07) ***  (3.07)  ***  (3.07)  *** 
Company  In  Shipping  Stage  -0.1372   -0.1318    -0.1321   -0.0247   -0.4690   -1.2298  
-
1.2334   -1.2365  
  (0.29)   (0.28)    (0.28)   (0.05)   (0.91)   (2.27) **  (2.27)  ** (2.27)  ** 
Company  In  Profitable  Stage  -0.3106   -0.3011    -0.3019   -0.1153   -0.4534   -1.4655  
-
1.4653   -1.4703   
  (0.64)   (0.62)    (0.62)   (0.22)   (0.82)   (2.62) ***  (2.62)  ***  (2.62)  *** 
Company  In  Re-Start  Stage  0.5986   0.6178    0.6163   0.0814   0.8543   0.3517   0.3693    0.3669   
  (0.39)   (0.41)    (0.40)   (0.09)   (0.48)   (0.31)   (0.32)    (0.32)   
Company  Stage  Missing  -1.0495    -1.0383   -1.0363   -0.7742   -1.1125    0.0000    0.0000   0.0000   
  (2.54) **  (2.51)  **  (2.50) **  (1.74) *  (2.52) **  (0.00)   (0.00)    (0.00)   
                            
Controls  for:                            
Round  Number  yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
Year  yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
Industry  yes   yes    yes   yes   yes   yes   yes    yes   
                              
R-squared  0.01    0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01    0.1    0.1   0.1   
Observations  8,897   8,897    8,897   3,513   6,586   1,554   1,554    1,554   
The sample consists of 8,944 ventures for which an IPO valuation was determined or for which there was no IPO.   The dependent variable is IPO Exit Return, defined as the ratio of the IPO valuation to the pre-
money valuation for the venture relative to the ratio of the IPO valuation to pre-money valuation of all ventures in the same industry in the current year.  LATER VENTURE is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  PRIOR SUCCESS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of one if the entrepreneur had started a previous 
venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise.  Any Entrepreneur in Later Venture is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur 
within the company had started a previous venture-backed company and zero otherwise.  Any Entrepreneur with Prior Success is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if any entrepreneur within the 
company started a previous venture-backed company that went public or filed to go public by December 2003 and zero otherwise.  VC Firm Experiencet is the difference between the log of the number of 
investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t and the average in year t of the number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t.   
Standard errors are clustered at portfolio company level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates.                  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.                           
 
 Table 9: Fund-Level Returns               
               
   (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)    
   OLS     OLS     OLS     WLS    
Share of Portfolio With LATER VENTURE  54.0521    59.1963    36.7272    310.7474   
  (1.21)    (1.24)   (0.63)   (1.70)  * 
Share of Portfolio With PRIOR SUCCESS          64.4079    -74.5977   
         (0.72)    (0.31)   
VC FIRM EXPERIENCE  20.0744    19.5406    20.0984    20.1381   
  (5.02)  ***  (4.77) ***  (5.01) ***  (3.50)  *** 
Controls:               
Vintage Year Fixed Effects  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Fund  Size  yes    yes   yes   yes   
Percentage in Each Industry  yes    yes    yes    yes   
Mean Round Number of Deals      yes           
R-squared  0.45    0.46   0.46   0.59   
Observations  514    482   514   514     
The sample consists of 370 VC funds with information from the 2004 Private Equity Performance Monitor.  The dependent 
variable is Fund IRR, defined as the IRR of the fund.  Share of Portfolio with Later Venture is the share of the individual VC 
firm's portfolio in later ventures of serial entrepreneurs over the years of the fund.  Share of Portfolio with Prior Success is 
the share of the individual VC firm's portfolio in later ventures of serial entrepreneurs where the entrepreneur was successful 
in the previous venture over the years of the fund.  VC FIRM EXPERIENCE is the difference between the log of the average 
number of investments made by venture capital organization f prior to year t for each investment in the fund and the average 
in year t of the average number of investments made by all organizations prior to year t. 
Standard errors are clustered at VC firm level. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses below coefficient estimates.   
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.           
 